1960s Social Activism and Conservative Political Change

The 1960s can be understood both as a decade of movements challenging American institutions and as a period when conservative Americans organized to gain political influence. Historian Terry H. Anderson emphasizes activists who exposed conflicts between American ideals and persistent problems; historian Mary C. Brennan stresses conservatives’ methodical construction of a political force. The interpretations differ in emphasis, not necessarily in whether the other development occurred. From 1945 to 1980, protest made demands for equality and political change visible, while conservative organizing gave opposition to some changes institutional and electoral power. Taken together, the interpretations explain why social change could be consequential without being accepted as a settled national consensus.

The postwar context helps explain why these competing forces mattered. The United States emerged from World War II with expanded responsibilities abroad and continuing disputes about the meaning of freedom and equality at home. By the 1960s, activists could frame demands for reform as efforts to bring national practice closer to professed democratic principles. Anderson’s interpretation is persuasive in emphasizing that protest was not simply public disorder: movements brought long-standing grievances into public debate and demanded institutional responses. However, the connection between ideals and action did not guarantee agreement about what equality required or how government should pursue it. The period’s conflicts arose partly because people could invoke the same language of freedom while advocating sharply different political outcomes.

The Red Power movement provides a concrete example of activism supporting Anderson’s interpretation. Native people occupied Alcatraz Island from 1969 to 1971, and the movement also included the 1973 occupation at Wounded Knee and broader Indigenous organizing. By the mid-1970s, hundreds of Indigenous organizations had formed. Some pressed for recognition of treaty commitments; others sought greater control over resources and community affairs. These forms of action made Indigenous political claims more visible and created organized pressure on government, rather than leaving decisions solely to federal institutions. Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act in 1975, followed by legislation on religious freedom and child welfare in 1978. This sequence supports Anderson because activism and lobbying helped press for changes in policy and political autonomy. It does not mean that every demand was met or that protest alone caused each law; it shows that organized claims could contribute to a government response.

The campaign over the Equal Rights Amendment demonstrates why Brennan’s interpretation also matters. After Congress sent the amendment to the states in 1972, it initially gained substantial support, but the ratification effort stalled. Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP ERA organization mobilized opponents by presenting the amendment as a threat to the status and protections of homemakers and families. Schlafly lobbied legislators and organized counter-rallies; the amendment ultimately failed to secure the required additional state ratifications before its time limit expired in 1982. This episode supports Brennan’s account of conservatives becoming organized participants in national politics: opposition did not remain private disagreement but developed into a campaign capable of affecting a major political outcome. It also shows that organized resistance could limit the consequences of movements pressing for gender equality. That outcome does not establish that all conservatives shared one motive, but it reveals the political effectiveness of a coordinated campaign.

Conservative organizing also reshaped electoral politics. In 1968, Richard Nixon appealed to a so-called “silent majority,” connecting demands for public order with criticism of protest and unrest. The campaign’s political significance lay not just in its rhetoric but in its ability to make anxiety about disorder an electoral issue. Later, conservative support grew through different constituencies and organizations. In the Sunbelt, business-friendly politics combined free-market ideas with conservative Protestant support; suburban activists participated in reading groups and political activity, while some joined groups such as Young Americans for Freedom and the John Birch Society. These developments fit Brennan’s argument that conservatism was not merely a reactionary mood but a developing political force. They also caution against explaining the right as a single movement: its supporters and organizations varied, and electoral appeal could unite people with different concerns.

The emergence of the New Right by the late 1970s further supports Brennan’s emphasis on organization. In 1979, Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority, which connected religious activism to electoral politics. At the same time, business leaders supported policy organizations and used lobbyists and political action committees to press their aims. Such institutions gave political activists ways to coordinate, communicate policy goals, and influence government beyond a single election or demonstration. The New Right’s later electoral strength therefore had roots in organizing during the period under consideration. This development does not show that conservative Americans were simply responding to protest: economic concerns, religious commitments, and opposition to federal regulation also mattered. Instead, it demonstrates how multiple interests could be assembled into a durable political coalition.

A serious objection is that emphasizing both interpretations may obscure their differences. Anderson describes movements that sought to confront injustice and change public policy; Brennan describes conservatives who built political power, sometimes to resist the direction or consequences of reform. These were not equivalent projects, and a balanced account should not imply that they had equal effects on every issue. Nor can the evidence establish that each conservative organization arose directly in response to a particular protest. Nevertheless, the interaction between the forces explains more than either interpretation alone: activism brought demands into public view, while organized opponents could contest those demands through campaigning, lobbying, and elections. From 1945 to 1980, protest was a significant source of change, but conservative organization helped determine how that change was debated, constrained, and politically received.

How the argument works

The essay distinguishes Anderson’s emphasis on activism from Brennan’s emphasis on conservative political organization, then argues that both forces shaped change through different mechanisms. Its examples connect Red Power to public pressure and policy response, and the anti-ERA campaign to organized opposition and a political outcome. The Nixon campaign and later New Right institutions show how conservative organizing developed through electoral appeals, grassroots activity, and advocacy organizations. The essay qualifies its claims by avoiding a single-cause explanation and by distinguishing evidence of an outcome from proof of every motive or causal link. For practice, choose examples that support each interpretation and explain specifically how each example does so.